Castro, Markey, Colleagues Urge U.S. to Apply Highest Nonproliferation Standards to Any Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Saudi Arabia Amid Growing Human Rights, National Security Concerns
Trump plans to host Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House Today
WASHINGTON, D.C. — Yesterday, Congressman Joaquin Castro (TX-20), Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA), a co-chair of the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, today led their colleagues in writing to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, urging the Trump administration to include the strongest possible “gold standard” nonproliferation measures in any nuclear cooperation agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to foreclose any pathway to a nuclear weapon.
The letter comes as President Trump plans to host Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House on Tuesday.
“Saudi Arabia has, on numerous occasions, expressed its interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a development would be highly destabilizing for the Middle East and could lead other states to reconsider their nuclear options. As is the case with Iran, preventing nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia should be one of the Trump administration’s highest priorities. It is therefore greatly concerning that the Trump Administration is pursuing an agreement that, without proper safeguards, could enable Saudi Arabia to produce a nuclear bomb. Given Riyadh’s nuclear ambitions, we are urging the Administration to include the strongest possible “gold standard” non-proliferation measures in any nuclear cooperation agreement. Giving Saudi Arabia nuclear technology without the strongest safeguards is a recipe for disaster,” the lawmakers wrote.
“Given Saudi Arabia’s nuclear intentions, it would be irresponsible for the United States to reach a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Riyadh that does not include the gold standard. A typical US ‘123 agreement’ under the Atomic Energy Act prohibits a partner country from enriching or reprocessing nuclear material acquired from the United States (without further agreement), but that country may do so with technology and nuclear material acquired from other sources. The stronger protections of the gold standard would prevent that. Agreeing to weaker nonproliferation measures with Saudi Arabia would undermine the existing global nonproliferation regime and exacerbate tensions across the Middle East,” the lawmakers continued.
The lawmakers request answers to the following questions by December 1, 2025:
- Does the Administration intend to inform the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs committees if and when a 123 agreement is reached with Saudi Arabia?
- In negotiations with Saudi Arabia, is the Administration seeking a 123 agreement with “gold standard” protections?
- Will the Administration require Saudi Arabia to implement the Additional Protocol?
- What nuclear technology is the Administration planning to provide to Saudi Arabia, who will provide it, when will it be transferred, and under what terms? Who will pay for the technology and how much will it cost?
- Is the United States considering constructing and operating a uranium-enrichment facility on Saudi soil?
- What is the status of negotiations towards diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel? Please describe the U.S. involvement, including the roles played by the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy.
- Is the United States still considering defense guarantees or commitments for Saudi Arabia in exchange for normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel?
- Is improvement of Saudi Arabia’s repressive human rights record an element of the negotiations? Will any agreement include provisions that address and seek to improve upon Saudi Arabia’s human rights and civil liberties practices?
- Will the United States require Saudi Arabia to cease all defense cooperation with the People’s Republic of China on ballistic missile and nuclear technology as a part of any agreement to share nuclear technology?
Senators Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), and Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), and Representatives Greg Casar (TX-35) Dina Titus (NV-01) Eleanor Homes Norton (D-DC), Pramila Jayapal (WA-07), Jim McGovern (MA-02), André Carson (IN-07), John Garamendi (CA-08), Don Beyer (VA-08), Mike Levin (CA-49) and Jamie Raskin (MD-08) co-signed the letter. Senator Merkley and Representatives Garamendi and Beyer are also co-chairs of the Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group.
Link to the full letter here.